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Abstract 
Social health care systems are inevitably confronted with the scarcity of resources 
and the resulting distributional challenges. Since prioritization implies distribu-
tional effects, decisions on respective rules should take citizens’ preferences into 
account. Thus, knowledge about citizens’ attitudes and preferences regarding dif-
ferent distributional issues implied by the type of financing health care is necessary 
to judge the public acceptance of a health system. In this study we concentrate on 
two distributive issues in the German health system: First, we analyse the ac-
ceptance of prioritizing decisions concerning the treatment of certain patient 
groups, in this case patients who all need a heart operation. Here we focus on the 
fact that a patient is strong smoker or a non-smoker, the criteria of age or the fact 
that a patient has or does not have young children. Second, we investigate Germans’ 
opinions towards income dependent health services. The results reveal strong ef-
fects of individuals’ attitudes regarding general aspects of the health system on pri-
orities, e.g. that individuals behaving health demanding should not be preferred. In 
addition, experiences of limited access to health services are found to have a strong 
influence on citizens’ attitudes, too. Finally, decisions about different prioritization 
criteria are found to be not independent. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Social health care systems are inevitably confronted with the scarcity of resources and the re-
sulting distributional challenges. One measure to deal with financial pressure on the system is 
e.g. to reduce public coverage of treatments and to increase out of pocket payments. Such pri-
vate payments are implemented in many health care systems. Criteria for prioritization are used, 
implicitly or explicitly, to define the border between public and private financing of health care. 
Since prioritization implies distributional effects not only on medical resources but also on 
health and quality of life, in our opinion decisions on respective rules should take citizens’ 
preferences into account. Knowledge about citizens’ attitudes and preferences regarding differ-
ent distributional issues implied by the type of financing health care is necessary to judge the 
public acceptance of a health system. 
Rules for rationing medical resources in public health systems require some ethical justification. 
There are several reasons derived from welfare economics why public preferences should be 
respected when allocation rules in public health systems are defined. On the one hand people 
are affected by the quality and extent of medical treatment as patients or potential patients. On 
the other hand people contribute to the financing of the public health system. From the perspec-
tive of Social Choice Theory, collective decisions on social institutions should be based on 
preferences of the citizens. In democratic societies the role of people as voters is important, too, 
and the acceptance of regulations of health provision by a majority of voters might be desirable. 
Thus, from the point of view of Public Choice Theory, governments, parties and the deciding 
committees should be informed about public opinion. In addition, German surveys show that a 
considerable share of the citizens claims that their preferences are considered or even that they 
have a voice in the committees where rules on allocation of medical treatments are decided (e.g. 
Diederich and Schreier 2010; Raspe and Stumpf 2013). An ethical justification of allocation 
rules may be reached by applying Rawls’s concept of a reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971). 
Following Elster (1995) public preferences should be included as one element of such a reflec-
tion process on finding ethically justified solutions. In our opinion this holds true particularly 
with regard to distributive justice in solving the scarcity problem of the public health system. 
We investigate the opinions of the German public towards prioritization of medical services in 
the public health sector and on income dependent quality of medical treatment. Thus, two 
strands of literature build the basis for our analysis. First, empirical studies on prioritizing de-
cisions, second, empirical research on the acceptance of income dependent health services.  
Empirical surveys investigating public preferences for priorities in the public health system 
differ in their research objective and in the presentation of the problem to the subjects. Many 
studies try to elicit priority rankings for treatments of groups needing them or groups of patients 
characterized by certain attributes. Subjects are asked to rank treatments of patient groups with 
respect to their relative importance or they have to decide if certain groups of patients should 
receive preferred treatment. Examples of this kind of questions can be found e.g. in a repre-
sentative German study by Raspe and Stumpf (2013). The authors report that priority setting in 
favor of treatment of children is the most accepted one. Majorities pro patients who are respon-
sible for care of kids or relatives were observed, too. A majority also voted for lower priorities 
for patients who damaged their own health. This is in accordance to a tendency observed by 
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Müller and Groß (2010) in an earlier German representative survey. Schomerus et al. (2006) in 
a representative study using telephone interviews report a result pointing into the same direc-
tion. If money for medical care would have to be saved the disease most frequently named by 
subjects is alcoholism. Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) report from a British study on rankings of 
patient groups where characteristics of patients were related to their past and expected future 
life span and health development in the past and with or without treatment in the future. They 
observe that subjects take past and expected future life years and respective health develop-
ments into account and that they prioritize younger over older.  
These results have in common that they ask for a ranking and not for a choice between alloca-
tions defining the extent of medical care. In priority decisions opportunity costs of decisions 
are not presented to the subjects. In an experimental study on rationing of medical resources 
Ahlert and Funke (2012) observe that having to decide between abstract and hypothetical de-
scribed patients knowing that the one not chosen will not receive the best or even no treatment 
influences the cognitive process of decision making. They conjecture that if opportunity costs 
consist of exclusion of treatments effectivity of treatment plays a prominent role as a decision 
criterion. Taking the different cognitive challenges of decisions on priorities versus decisions 
on allocations into account, there is no trivial mode to derive decisions on rationing of medical 
resources from priority rankings.  
There are only a few German studies where questions are framed as decisions on allocations 
with opportunity costs defined by an exclusion from treatment or from public financing of the 
treatment. In a representative survey (Allianz 2009) subjects were confronted with the hypo-
thetical policy that in the future some treatments will not be financed by the public insurance if 
people are older than some threshold, e.g. hip operations for women aged 65 or over. This 
policy was rejected by a clear majority of more than 80% of the subjects. 60% even strongly 
disagreed. Similarly Müller and Groß (2010) find that more that 80% reject age as criterion for 
rationing (the extent of rationing is not clearly defined in the question) compared to less than 
30 % who are against rationing if patients have damaged their health e.g. by smoking or drink-
ing alcohol.  
There are some studies where questions are formulated such that they lie between the two ex-
treme cases of ranking of options and exclusion of options. In a representative German study 
using computer aided personal interviews Diederich et al. (2009) ask subjects if certain groups 
of persons should receive preferred treatment. They instruct the interviewer that preferred 
means that this person is treated first. The other person is treated later or with viewer resources, 
but that it does not necessarily mean that this person will not be treated. Results related to 
groups of patients show (cf. Diederich and Schreier 2010) that strong majorities prefer persons 
with life threatening or acute diseases or children, whereas a majority does not prefer e.g. per-
sons with children or with social responsibility (taking care of relatives). Except for the priori-
ties for children they find no clear majority for the ranking of treatments of younger and older 
persons. About 50 % disagree to prefer younger to older people, more than 80% disagree to 
prefer people in the age span of working activity. With respect to health damaging behavior 
they use a different type of question and ask whether these people should make higher out of 
pocket payments. They report that in general a majority is of the opinion that these patients 
should contribute more money to their treatments than other patients. However, the kind of 
health damaging behavior seems to matter. Consumption of drugs, alcohol and smoking find 
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strong majorities, risky sports and sun bathing, too, whereas unhealthy diets and lack of move-
ment do not.  
Summarizing the findings from former studies so far we do not find a clear picture of the atti-
tudes of the German public related to the priorities of young versus old, except for children. We 
also find mixed evidence with respect to priorities for patients with children or those taking 
care of some person. However, we find evidence that majorities would accept to posteriorize 
patients with health damaging behavior. In our case this applies to smoking. 
Related to the distribution of opinions towards priorities in the German population there exists 
some literature taking personal characteristics of each subject into account including opinions 
she expresses. However, there are only a few studies investigating the impact of socio-economic 
variables on subjects’ decisions, and additionally including items that represent attitudes to-
wards different aspects of the health system and attitudes towards collective goals in society.  
In their representative study Raspe and Stumpf (2013) check the impact of different variables 
on priority decisions, among them age, sex, social status, own health status, if respondents are 
overweight, smokers, or do not move much, if they are satisfied with the health supply, and if 
they judge the solidarity principle to be just. The only clear results the authors find is related to 
the posteriorizing of patients with a life style that imposes risks on their health. Respondents of 
age below 70, people who are content or very content with the health system, those who are in 
favor of a comprehensive public health service, and the group of smokers or overweight people 
or those who do not move much do significantly less often agree to the posteriorizing. Other 
variables did not turn out to be significant.  
The second strand of literature focuses on the acceptance of income dependent health services. 
In Germany it is an important and controversial issue of public opinion whether it is just that 
persons with higher income can afford better health service than people with lower income. 
However, to the best of our knowledge this empirical research question has not been analyzed 
in a representative study so far. Thus we refer to some related literature on redistribution. As 
suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1983), current income affects individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution. Individuals above mean income are supposed to oppose redistribution as they 
are expected to be net losers of redistribution. In contrast, individuals below average income 
should be in favor of redistribution as they are net beneficiaries. This theoretical result would 
imply that individuals with higher incomes should be in favor of income dependent health ser-
vices since they are able to obtain private insurance more cheaply than redistributive public 
insurance. The related empirical evidence on income dependent preferences on redistribution 
is quite mixed (see for example Corneo and Grüner 2002; Alesina and Giuliano 2011). How-
ever, these findings do not account for individual’s health status. According to Gouveia (1997) 
and Kifmann (2005), rational utility maximizing individuals not only focus on income but also 
on the ratio of their relative income position and their relative risk to fall ill when voting about 
the level of redistribution devoted to health. If their risk of falling ill is higher than their relative 
income position, they are expected to favor publicly financed health insurance as they might 
benefit irrespectively of their financial situation. In terms of income dependent health services, 
individuals do not only take their income position into account but also their relative risk of 
falling ill. Attitudes towards redistribution may differ between issues of different social ser-
vices. According to Fong (2006) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005), subjects prefer a redistrib-
utive welfare state if recipients are not perceived to be responsible for their neediness, like in 
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cases of sickness. In terms of income dependent health services this means that if sick people 
are not responsible for their health status income dependent health services would be seen as 
unfair. 
In this study we concentrate on distributive issues in the German health system. First, we ana-
lyze attitudes towards prioritizing decisions concerning the treatment of certain patient groups 
thereby contributing to the heterogeneous literature on prioritization criteria. Second, we inves-
tigate public acceptance of income dependent health services. To the best of our knowledge, 
this aspect has not been analyzed before. We use representative data from the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP) of the year 2011 for Germany. Related to the first problem the 
survey contains questions on priority rankings of patients who all need a heart operation. We 
will not include different degrees of severity of the disease or other medical attributes as a 
characteristic. Hence a rather abstract and anonymous view on medical allocation problems is 
taken that is very different from the perspective of a physician who has to decide on treatments 
of specific patients dependent on medical criteria. Three scenarios are presented where two 
patients differ with respect to one criterion (the fact that a patient is strong smoker or a non-
smoker, age or the fact that a patient has or does not have young children). These three charac-
teristics of patient groups are representative of more general properties of patients that may 
have an influence on priority setting in society. Smoking represents personal characteristics 
where the person has at least some control and hence some responsibility for consequences on 
her health. Age stands for personal characteristics beyond the influence of an individual. Having 
children or not describes external effects on dependents and on society. To uncover acceptance 
of income dependent health services in the second problem, we draw on a question whether it 
is fair or unfair that individuals with higher incomes can afford better health services. Here the 
focus is on the issue of a personal entitlement and ability to use own financial resources for 
health services. Besides socio-demographic variables, we also include respondents’ attitudes 
and opinions towards different aspects of the health system to investigate the preferences of the 
German public towards these issues. 
In the next section we formulate some general hypotheses on the decision behavior of respond-
ents concerning the issues mentioned above. In section 3 we explain our empirical strategy, 
describe the data, refine the hypotheses, and present some descriptive statistics. The results of 
the empirical analysis and interpretations are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 con-
cludes. 
2 HYPOTHESES 
Our analysis strives for exploring interrelations between opinions on priority setting in health 
care, justice intuitions, and other personal opinions or characteristics. According to philosoph-
ical categories (cf. Harsanyi 1955, 1978) individuals’ perspectives on social problems can be 
separated into egoistic preferences and moral preferences. Within her egoistic preferences in-
dividuals strive for their own benefit, whereas their moral preferences focus on ethical aspects 
and the distribution of welfare within the whole social group. Both types of preferences may 
play a role of different strength and are aggregated by the decision maker. This means that we 
interpret observed preferences as a mixture of egoistic and moral preferences which the subject 
forms by weighing both aspects. 
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In order to detect the impact of an egoistic view we consider cases where subjects match the 
respective characteristics of some patient group. With regard to prioritizing decisions there ex-
ists empirical evidence by Alvarez and Rodríguez-Míguez (2011) from a study in Spain sug-
gesting that subjects attach higher ranks to treatments of patients that are similar to their own 
medical condition. However, we generalize this finding in hypotheses with respect to socioec-
onomic characteristics. E.g. in the question of smoker versus non-smoker, we conjecture that 
smokers more often prefer the smoker than non-smokers do, and non-smokers more often prefer 
the non-smoker than smokers do. In the question of priorities between patients of age 30 vs. 70 
we suppose that young people more often prefer the young patient than older subjects do, and 
old people more often prefer the older patient than young patients would do. In the question 
distinguishing between patients with or without children we suppose that people with children 
more often prefer patients with children than subjects without children do and subjects without 
children more often prefer patients without children than subjects with children do. With regard 
to the judgment on justice of the fact that people with higher income can afford better health 
service the similarity of respondent and patient group is related by own income. We hypothesize 
that income has a significantly positive impact on the acceptance of inequality in health service.  
Related to moral judgments on prioritization an aversion to exclude patients from treatment and 
the relevance of different egalitarian norms have been observed in experimental studies in 
health economics (cf. e.g. Green 2009; Ahlert et al. 2013). Therefore, we conjecture that in all 
three prioritization scenarios many subjects reveal a preference for the answer “it should not 
make a difference”. However there may be differences between the characteristics. If strict 
preferences are expressed, according to the insights from the literature overview, in case of 
smoking there seems to be a quite strong norm to assign priorities to the non-smoker, resulting 
in a quite large share of respondents voting for this option. However, in case of age we suppose 
a general weak tendency in society to prefer the younger patient; in case of patients with chil-
dren we suppose that a small share in society prefers this group. With regard to the judgment 
on inequality of health treatment we assume that a majority of people have a preference for 
income independent treatment. 
When weighing her egoistic and her moral preference the perceived public moral acceptability 
of reasons for prioritizing of certain patient groups may play a role for an individual’s decision. 
We assume that smoking as an aspect of health damaging behavior is internalized as some moral 
reason for discrimination by smokers themselves. Thus we hypothesize that smokers show a 
strong tendency to the “no-difference” option in the smoker vs. non-smoker question. The pub-
lic moral norm for priorities in case of age seems to be ambiguous in society with a weak ten-
dency towards the young. Therefore, we assume some influence of the norm of preferring the 
younger also in judgments of older people. This may result in a larger share of older subjects 
choosing the no-difference option than the share of younger subjects choosing this option. In 
case of children vs. no-children we assume that there is a strong tendency towards “no-differ-
ence” in both groups, since preference for people with children has no large public support. 
Therefore the aspect of having children will probably not be used by many subjects with chil-
dren as a justification to claim priorities for patients with children. We conjecture the analogous 
decision behavior for people without children; they will show a strong tendency towards no-
difference. We assume that people with high income may also have internalized the norm of 
equal access to medical treatment to some extent and a large share will judge inequality to be 
unfair. However, we hypothesize that the weighing of egoistic and moral preferences will be 
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different between groups of high and low income, i.e. that subjects with low income will more 
often decide income dependent health care to be unfair. 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data 
For empirically analyzing attitudes towards distributional issues we use data from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 2011, Health and Health Care Module (ISSP Research 
Group 2013). The ISSP is a continuous programme of cross national annual surveys on specific 
topics in social science. Since the beginning of the programme in 1984, the health module was 
implemented for the first time in 2011. The empirical source provides individual data on health 
priorities and socioeconomic characteristics for representative samples of the population. In this 
paper Germany is in the spotlight and the data set for Germany contains about 1,681 respond-
ents. 
According to our aims, the empirical analysis is split into attitudes towards prioritizing deci-
sions concerning the treatment of certain patient groups on the one side and acceptance of in-
come dependent health services among German citizens on the other. 
The data set contains three questions on priorities in case of a heart operation which are close 
to a ranking of groups of patients, but include some aspect of opportunity costs, too. Two 
equally sick patients are described who need the same heart operation. The subject is informed 
that they differ in one special aspect (smoker vs. non-smoker, age 30 vs. age 70, having children 
vs. no children). Then the respondent is asked who should be operated first or if there should 
be made no-difference. This formulation is a little different from the pure priority elicitation 
since the time sequence of the operations is indicated. No information is given on the expected 
time delay or if the treatment will be of lower quality. However, especially in case of a heart 
disease, respondents may think that having to wait longer on a heart operation imposes some 
additional burden of waiting and risk of complications or death on that patient. Thus some kind 
of opportunity costs may be perceived by the subjects. However the formulation of the question 
is far away from suggesting that the patient who has to wait longer will die before he receives 
the operation.  
For the econometric analysis, we take the answers to these three questions as dependent varia-
bles indicating German’s attitudes towards prioritization criteria. 
To uncover the acceptance of income dependent health services in Germany, we use answers 
on a 5 item Likert scale between very fair (1) and very unfair (5). The categorical variable 
judgment of inequality will be used in the second part of the econometric analysis.4  
As explanatory variables, we use socioeconomic characteristics, attitudes towards aspects of 
the health system, indicators for health behavior, indicators for health status and insurance cov-
erage as well as variables covering collective goals. A description of the variables is presented 
in table 1.  
                                                 
4 The exact wording in the questionnaire of the ISSP survey is: „Is it fair or unfair that people with higher incomes 
can afford better health care than people with lower incomes? (1) very fair, (2) somewhat fair, (3) neither fair nor 
unfair, (4) somewhat unfair and (5) very unfair”, with can’t choose also admissible. However, the latter are disre-
garded from the regression. 
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Table 1: Variable description 
variable name label 
socioeconomic Variables 
female female yes/no 
age2 age>=30 and <40 years 
age3 age>=40 and <50 years 
age4 age>=50 and <65 years 
age5 age>=65 years 
working currently in paid work yes/no 
f_inc_eq1 net equivalent household income category 1 (<  750 €) 
f_inc_eq2 net equivalent household income category 2 ( 750 € – 1,500 €) 
f_inc_eq4 net equivalent household income category 4 ( 2,250 € – 3,000 €) 
f_inc_eq5 net equivalent household income category 5 (>3,000 €) 
edu2 lower or upper secondary school 
edu3 post-secondary school, non-tertiary school 
edu4 lower level tertiary or upper level tertiary 
married married yes/no 
divorced divorced yes/no 
widowed widowed yes/no 
children1 one child in household yes/no 
children2 2 children in household yes/no 
children3 3 or more children in household yes/no 
east East German yes/no 
attitudes towards aspects of the health system 
high confidence high confidence with current health system yes/no 
reform† health system should be (completely) changed yes/no 
limited services† government should provide only limited services yes/no 
inefficient health system† health care system is inefficient yes/no 
higher taxes† willing to pay higher taxes to improve care system yes/no 
no access* no access to publicly funded health care if health demanding behavior y/n 
reason: behavior* severe health problems: reason health demanding behavior yes/no 
reason: genes* severe health problems: reason genes yes/no 
reason: poverty* severe health problems: reason poverty yes/no 
best treatment* would receive best available treatment if falling ill yes/no 
health behavior 
cigarettes 1-5* smokes between 1 to 5 cigarettes per day yes/no 
cigarettes 6-10* smokes between 6 to 10 cigarettes per day yes/no 
cigarettes >10* smokes more than 10 cigarettes per day yes/no 
alcohol* has more than several times a week 4 alcoholic drinks yes/no 
health status and insurance coverage 
SAH self-assessed-health: 1=very good to 5=very bad 
hospital hospital treatment within last 12 months yes/no 
no treatment: waiting list† did not get medical treatment: waiting list was too long yes/no 
SHI insured by social health insurance yes/no 
SHI & private suppl. SHI & private supplemental insurance yes/no 
insurance civil servants health coverage for civil servants yes/no 
collective goals 
non profit working in non-profit organization yes/no 
religion religious denomination yes/no 
Note: *Variables which are included only in the estimations of prioritizing decisions, † variables exclusively 
included in the estimation equation for income dependent health services. 
 
The group of socioeconomic variables covers gender, age, education, income, family and labor 
force status, number of children and a variable indicating East German residence. Within this 
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group of variables, we can test three of our motives discussed in the previous section. Regarding 
prioritization criteria, the egoistic hypothesis expects younger people to prefer more often the 
young patient than older subjects do, and old people to prefer more often the older patient than 
young patients. Accordingly, we expect the age variables (reference is age1) to significantly 
affect individual’s attitudes towards the prioritization criteria of age. To investigate egoistic 
motives with respect to the criteria of having children or not, we refer to three indicator varia-
bles covering the number of children within the household (reference is no children within the 
household). The hypothesis in this case assumes families with children to be more in favor of 
patients with children than subjects without children and subjects without children to prefer 
more often patients without children. If moral motives of equal access prevail, the respective 
characteristics should not influence individual’s attitudes towards prioritization.  
In the question on income dependent health services, individual’s income position should be of 
particular relevance. Income is divided into five income categories using the monthly net house-
hold income. Monthly net household income is adjusted by the square root of the number of 
household members to cover within household economies of scale (cf. Buhmann et al. 1988; 
Siciliani and Verzulli 2009). In addition, we refer to a relative income position compared to the 
median, with the 100–150 % interval of median net household equivalent income as reference 
category. Thus, according to the egoistic view, we hypothesize the acceptance of income de-
pendent health services to increase with increasing income. If individuals value the moral mo-
tive of equal access to health care very strongly, income dependent health services should be 
treated as unfair, even by high incomes. 
The second group of independent variables deals with specific attitudes towards various aspects 
of the health system. These variables are included to control for some general attitudes and their 
impact on prioritizing decisions and the acceptance of income dependent health services. The 
variable high confidence equals one if the respondent has (very) high confidence with the cur-
rent health system. For prioritizing decisions (judgment of distribution justice), we expect indi-
viduals with high confidence to favor the no-difference option (neither nor respectively) due to 
the general trust in the system to choose the one who need it most (not the one with the highest 
income). The variables reform, limited access, inefficient health system and higher taxes are 
exclusively incorporated in the estimation of income dependent health services. In this group, 
the variable limited access covers the preference to reduce health services to a minimum. Indi-
viduals with this preference are assumed to judge income dependent health services as fair as 
they are able to obtain private coverage in accordance to their financial ability.   
The empirical analysis of prioritizing decisions contains the variables no access, reason: be-
havior, genes, poverty and best treatment to control for general attitudes towards the health 
system. No access is expected to affect individual’s attitudes towards the prioritizing criterion 
of smoking behavior. A tendency to deny access to publicly funded health services for those 
behaving health demanding is associated with a strong preference to favor the non-smoker over 
the smoker. The same holds true for the variable reason: behavior covering respondent’s atti-
tudes towards the reason of health problems. If respondents think that health problems arise 
because of health demanding behavior than they are more likely to give priority to the non-
smoker than to the smoker. Finally, best treatment is an indicator whether the respondents think 
they are getting the best treatment if they are falling ill. People of this conviction are hypothe-
sized to prefer the no-difference option in each of the priority criteria.  
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The next group of variables reflects respondent’s health behavior and is considered only in the 
prioritizing decision case. From an egoistic perspective, smokers should prefer the smokers to 
be prioritized. However, we have conjectured before that smokers themselves may have inter-
nalized their health damaging behavior as a moral reason for discriminating them. Accordingly, 
we expect smokers to show a strong tendency to the no-difference option in the smoker vs. non-
smoker question. 
Moreover, we control for individual’s health status and their type of insurance coverage in both 
distributional questions. Especially in the case of judgment of income dependent health ser-
vices, the variable no treatment: waiting list is of particular interest. This variable covers the 
experience of respondents who did not get a medical treatment because the waiting list was too 
long. These experiences should negatively influence respondent’s preferences regarding the 
judgment of income dependent health services. Finally, we control for the influence of collec-
tive goals, i.e. the effect of religiousness and whether a respondent works in a non-profit organ-
ization. The summary statistics for all independent variables are presented in table 2.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
socioeconomic Variables 
female 1681 0.49 0.50 0 1 
age2 1681 0.12 0.33 0 1 
age3 1681 0.19 0.40 0 1 
age4 1681 0.28 0.45 0 1 
age5 1681 0.22 0.42 0 1 
f_inc_eq1 1452 0.10 0.30 0 1 
f_inc_eq2 1452 0.41 0.49 0 1 
f_inc_eq4 1452 0.13 0.33 0 1 
f_inc_eq5 1452 0.08 0.26 0 1 
edu2 1673 0.15 0.35 0 1 
edu3 1673 0.58 0.49 0 1 
edu4 1673 0.25 0.43 0 1 
married 1680 0.55 0.50 0 1 
widowed 1680 0.07 0.26 0 1 
divorced 1680 0.08 0.27 0 1 
children1 1681 0.13 0.33 0 1 
children2 1681 0.06 0.24 0 1 
children3 1681 0.02 0.13 0 1 
east 1681 0.34 0.47 0 1 
attitudes towards aspects of the health system 
high confidence 1607 0.42 0.49 0 1 
reform† 1621 0.43 0.50 0 1 
limited services† 1582 0.19 0.39 0 1 
inefficient health system† 1592 0.41 0.49 0 1 
higher taxes† 1592 0.27 0.45 0 1 
no access* 1585 0.40 0.49 0 1 
reason: behavior* 1608 0.75 0.43 0 1 
reason: genes* 1583 0.73 0.44 0 1 
reason: poverty* 1603 0.51 0.50 0 1 
best treatment* 1587 0.39 0.49 0 1 
health behavior 
cigarettes 1-5* 1657 0.05 0.21 0 1 
cigarettes 6-10* 1657 0.08 0.27 0 1 
cigarettes >10* 1657 0.17 0.37 0 1 
alcohol* 1681 0.06 0.24 0 1 
health status and insurance coverage 
SAH 1663 3.03 0.89 1 5 
hospital 1669 0.18 0.38 0 1 
no treatment: waiting list† 1664 0.07 0.26 0 1 
SHI 1648 0.82 0.39 0 1 
SHI & private suppl. 1648 0.07 0.25 0 1 
insurance civil servants 1648 0.05 0.21 0 1 
collective goals 
non-profit 1505 0.21 0.41 0 1 
religion 1680 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Note: Data are weighted. *Variables which are included only in the estimations of prioritizing decisions, † variables 
exclusively included in the estimation equation for income dependent health services. 
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Overall, the data set consists of 1,681 individuals, 49 % of them are females. The most common 
income category is f_inc_eq2 covering about 41 % of the respondents. In 13 % of the house-
holds one child is living, 6 % of the respondents have two children and only 2 % have three or 
more children in their household. While 42 % exhibit a (very) high confidence with the current 
health system, about 43 % think that the health system should be completely changed. In line 
with this figure, about 41 % think that the health system is inefficient. With respect to health 
damaging behavior, 40 % would refuse those individuals from publicly funded health services. 
A higher fraction of about 70 % believes that severe health problems are due to health damaging 
behavior or genes while poverty as another reason is less often chosen. In our sample, about 
30 % are smokers, 17 % of them smoking more than ten cigarettes per day. Regarding health 
status and insurance coverage, the average self-assessed health status is about three, i.e. good. 
About 7 % of the respondents have experienced to be refused from medical treatment because 
the waiting list was too long. The underlying data set adequately covers the insurance coverage 
structure in Germany, i.e. 82 % are insured by the SHI. 
3.2 Observations from descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 to figure 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables dealing 
with prioritization criteria, each graph separated by characteristic of the respective patient 
group. Among the non-smokers, about 31 % give priority to non-smokers, whereas ca. 68 % 
are not willing to prioritize according to smoking behavior. Smokers are not going to receive 
any support from non-smokers. However, also in the group of smokers, the fraction voting for 
smokers to be treated first is negligible. In contrast, smokers obviously strongly tend to prefer 
the no-difference option, i.e. they do not give much weight to their egoistic preferences when 
decisions about priority of treatments have to be derived. These observations are in line with 
the hypotheses discussed before. 
 
Figure 1: Prioritization criterion smoker 
We see a similar pattern with regard to the priority criteria of age. Support to prioritize the old 
is somewhat higher than support for smokers, but remains on a very low level for both groups. 
About one third of the old give priority to the young while two thirds are not willing to accept 
age as a prioritization criterion. This observation changes slightly when young are considered. 
Almost 45 % of them attach priority to subjects that match their characteristics. The tendency 
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of the results confirm our hypotheses, however the extent of prioritization of the young is 
stronger than the expected vague priority. 
 
Figure 2: Prioritization criterion age 
Finally, families without responsibility for small children seem not to find support within the 
German society to be treated first. This holds true for families with children as well as for 
families without children. The fraction devoted to subjects with children increases from 29 % 
in the subsample without children to about 34 % in the subsamples of families with children. 
Again, the option no-difference finds strong support indicating a rather strong aversion to make 
priority decisions according to the family status as conjectured in our hypotheses. 
 
Figure 3: Prioritization criterion having children 
Figure 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variable judgment of inequality, separated by 
income categories. Across all income categories, people judge income dependent health ser-
vices to be unfair. In total, almost 80 % think that is unfair that people with higher incomes can 
afford better health care. Even individuals in the highest income group are treating income 
dependent health services as unfair (about 70 %). However, the strength of aversion decreases 
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with increasing income, while still remaining on a very high level. Only about 7 % think that it 
would be fair if higher incomes get better health services. These observations confirm the ten-
dency of our monotonicity hypotheses relating own income and the fairness judgment. 
 
Figure 4: Judgment of inequality 
3.3 Empirical Methods 
In the first part, attitudes towards prioritizing criteria will be analyzed. The corresponding var-
iables are categorical. However, the descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables of 
prioritizing decisions exhibits only very few answers in favor of smokers, old patients and fam-
ilies without children. Thus it seems critical to apply an ordered probit model for categorical 
variables in the econometric analysis. Accordingly, we drop the middle categories for all prior-
itizing decision questions resulting in three binary variables: 
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Simple binary probit models are used to analyze attitudes towards prioritizing criteria. The 
models take the following form: 
(3.0) * 0 1i i iy X       
where *iy  is the latent variable, i.e. attitudes towards prioritizing criteria, that is linked to the 
three dependent variables covering attitudes towards the criteria smoking, age and children. 
The independent variables are covered by Xi and β reflects the parameters to be estimated. 
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Moreover the common assumptions regarding variance and the distribution of the error terms 
apply (cf. Long 1997).  
However, there might be an overall correlation of attitudes towards prioritization among the 
three dependent variables. Hence, we apply a model for simultaneous equations in the second 
step. The advantage of these models is that we are able to estimate three equations that seem to 
be independent at the first view. The binary variables yield to a multivariate probit model. The 
multivariate probit is an extension of the bivariate probit model to more than two equations (cf. 
Greene and Hensher 2010). The equation system reads:5 
(3.0) 
 
 
* *
1 1 1 1 1 1
* *
; y 1 0
; y 1 0
i i
M M iM iM M M
y X y
y X y
 
 
   
   
 
In our case, the equation system consists of three equations according to the three prioritizing 
decision (1) smoker vs. non-smoker, (2) young vs. old and (3) having children or not-having 
children. Hence, we have m = 1,…, 3 equations and i = 1,…,1,681 observations. The vector 
imX  includes the independent variables and m  the associated parameters. The error terms 
 1, ,i iM   are normally distributed with a constant variance (cf. Maddala 1983). 
(3.0) 
1 2
1 2
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where R is the correlation matrix. The covariance between the error terms of equations L and 
M is ρ. ρ is statistically different from zero (i.e. a non-independence of the error terms) if unob-
served factors significantly affect the probability that yi = 1. Hence all equations can be esti-
mated separately as single probit models but this might be inefficient as it ignores the correla-
tion between the disturbances (cf. Greene and Hensher 2010; Maddala 1983). 
In the second part of the empirical investigation ordered probit models are specified to analyze 
the acceptance of income dependent health services.6 As the category very fair is only rarely 
depicted (see figure 4), we transform the original five-item Likert scale to a four-point categor-
ical variable thereby combining the categories very fair and somewhat fair to one category. The 
new variable reads: 
 
1 very fair or somewhat unfair
2 neither fair nor unfair  
  
3 somewhat unfair          
4 unfair                          
judgment of inequality


 


  
The ordered probit model is a generalization of the simple probit model in eq. (3.0), where the 
latent variable *iy  is linked to the variable judgment of inequality, i.e. a four-point categorical 
                                                 
5 We do not expect a potential endogeneity of either of the dependent variables. Thus, we restrain from estimating 
a recursive multivariate probit model (cf. Maddala 1983) as this would require some theoretical advice on the 
dependency of the prioritizing decision questions. 
6 We also tested whether the parallel lines assumption of the standard ordered probit model holds or whether to 
apply a generalized ordered probit model. However, results of a likelihood-ratio test and a brant test were not able 
to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients. Thus we proceed with the standard ordered probit model. 
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variable. Since the mean of the latent variable judgment of inequality is not identified, the or-
dered probit model assumes a constant variance of one. For the purpose of identification, the 
constant has to be defined to zero (cf. Long 1997). 
4 RESULTS 
According to our empirical strategy, the empirical analysis is split into two parts. First, attitudes 
towards prioritizing decisions concerning the treatment of certain patient groups are analyzed. 
Second, acceptance of income dependent health services among German citizens is investi-
gated. In both cases we estimate one restricted model incorporating only the socioeconomic 
variables (see table 1) and one full model including all independent variables. 
4.1 Prioritization attitudes 
Smoking behavior as a prioritization criterion 
First, we investigate the prioritizing decision regarding the criterion smoking. The results of 
single probit models for the restricted [1] and full specification [2] are presented in table 4. In 
both specifications, we find age to significantly affect the probability to choose the no-differ-
ence option. Thus, older citizens tend to choose the no-difference option while younger indi-
viduals are likely to prioritize non-smokers. Among the socioeconomic variables, education 
exhibits statistical significance. However, this effect diminishes if additional factors are in-
cluded. Across both specifications, East Germans are more in favor to prioritize non-smokers 
than West Germans. Hence, personal responsibility seems to be more important in East Ger-
many than in West Germany. 
Among attitudes towards aspects of the health system, the variable no access positively affects 
the prioritizing decisions indicating a strong tendency to accept smoking as criterion to make a 
prioritization decision. Individuals not willing to provide access to publicly funded health ser-
vices for subjects behaving health damaging strongly prioritize non-smokers to be treated first. 
In addition, respondents thinking that severe health problems arise from a health demanding 
behavior do more often prioritize non-smokers. This might be due to moral motives that indi-
viduals behaving health damaging do not deserve to be treated first because they are individu-
ally responsible. 
Own health behavior is of particular relevance for the prioritizing decision between non-smoker 
and no-difference. The more cigarettes are smoked per day, the higher the probability to choose 
the no-difference option. This confirms our conjecture that smokers seem to value moral rea-
sons quite strongly. They seem to be aware that smoking is publicly not accepted and that the 
majority of the public might be willing to discriminate smokers against non-smokers. May be 
they also accept their responsibility for health risks through smoking. Accordingly, choosing 
the no-difference option is a viable compromise between egoistic and moral considerations for 
smokers where they are not penalized for their own behavior.  
We do not find individuals’ health status or type of insurance coverage to significantly affect 
respondent’s attitudes towards prioritization with respect to smoking behavior. Religiousness 
has a negative impact for non-smokers vs. no-difference. Thus, religious subjects show a ten-
dency to reject smoking or health damaging behavior as a prioritization criterion. 
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Table 4: Estimation results single probit models – non-smoker vs. no-difference 
 [1] 
restricted model 
[2] 
full specification 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female -0.1267 (0.084) -0.1916 (0.101)* 
age2 -0.1626 (0.153) -0.0810 (0.180) 
age3 -0.3778 (0.153)** -0.4657 (0.184)** 
age4 -0.6222 (0.160)*** -0.7827 (0.195)*** 
age5 -0.4597 (0.192)** -0.7995 (0.238)*** 
working 0.0866 (0.119) 0.0360 (0.150) 
f_inc_eq1 0.0577 (0.160) 0.2248 (0.193) 
f_inc_eq2 -0.1042 (0.103) -0.1311 (0.122) 
f_inc_eq4 0.1406 (0.131) 0.2153 (0.155) 
f_inc_eq5 0.0310 (0.164) 0.0618 (0.194) 
edu2 -0.4900 (0.390) -0.0828 (0.525) 
edu3 -0.7404 (0.382)* -0.2830 (0.517) 
edu4 -0.6969 (0.390)* -0.3730 (0.524) 
married 0.0800 (0.119) 0.0561 (0.137) 
divorced  -0.0534 (0.179) -0.1553 (0.222) 
widowed 0.3599 (0.198) 0.4938 (0.234)** 
children1 -0.0293 (0.128) 0.0323 (0.154) 
children2 -0.0950 (0.181) -0.0558 (0.220) 
children3 -0.0189 (0.317) 0.1902 (0.348) 
east 0.2201 (0.097)** 0.2884 (0.114)** 
high confidence   0.0044 (0.101) 
no access   0.6538 (0.097)*** 
reason: behavior   0.2978 (0.114)*** 
reason: genes   -0.1540 (0.108) 
reason: poverty   -0.0221 (0.099) 
best treatment   -0.0035 (0.106) 
cigarettes 1-5   -0.5901 (0.251)** 
cigarettes 6-10   -0.6394 (0.188)*** 
cigarettes >10   -0.7141 (0.149)*** 
alcohol   -0.0128 (0.216) 
SAH   -0.0442 (0.062) 
hospital   -0.1176 (0.134) 
SHI   0.0876 (0.202) 
SHI & private suppl.   0.0881 (0.256) 
insurance civil servants   -0.0627 (0.300) 
non profit 0.1848 (0.099)* 0.2446 (0.124)** 
religion -0.1373 (0.095) -0.2424 (0.112)** 
_cons 0.3326 (0.406) -0.0480 (0.624) 
N 1,200  979  
AIC 1358.1  1025.4  
BIC 1474.2  1211.1  
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.044  0.147  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Age as a prioritization criterion 
In the second step, age as a characteristic that is beyond the influence of an individual is con-
sidered as a prioritizing criterion. Results for both, the restricted [1] and the full specification 
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[2] are presented in table 5. Age affects the probability to choose the no-difference option sig-
nificantly in case of choosing between priority for the young and no-difference. Thus older 
individuals are more likely to opt for the no-difference option than individuals of the youngest 
age group. Accordingly, egoistic motives are stronger for the youngest age group. With respect 
to our general hypotheses, we find evidence that the moral norm of equal access is more likely 
to be applied by older subjects resulting to choose the no-difference option than by younger 
individuals. We also find individuals with higher income (f_inc_eq4, f_inc_eq5) to be signifi-
cantly more in favor of prioritizing young. In contrast to the prioritization of non-smokers, East 
Germans more often prefer the no-difference option in prioritizing decisions according to age. 
These judgments seem to be consistent as the characteristic of age is not within the control of 
the patient whereas smokers are seen is seen to be responsible for the consequences of their 
behavior. 
In the full specification, age still affects attitudes towards prioritizing young vs. no-difference. 
The hypothesis that the young might be more driven by egoistic motives than the old proves 
robust. The variable no access exhibits statistical significance also for the prioritizing decision 
regarding age. The attitude of restricting the access to public financed health services for indi-
viduals behaving health damaging results in a strong preference to prioritize young. Probably, 
this variable captures a more general willingness to prioritize (this will be analyzed in section 
4.3). The conviction to get the best medical treatment in case of illness is associated with a 
strong preference to oppose prioritization with respect to age. 
Neither health behavior nor health status nor type of insurance coverage exhibits any signifi-
cance in the context of the prioritizing decision of age. 
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Table 5: Estimation results single probit models – young vs. no-difference 
 [1] 
restricted model 
[2] 
full specification 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female -0.1256 (0.078) -0.0664 (0.091) 
age2 -0.2907 (0.148)* -0.3912 (0.170)** 
age3 -0.5998 (0.148)*** -0.7329 (0.173)*** 
age4 -0.5801 (0.150)*** -0.6878 (0.176)*** 
age5 -0.4111 (0.181)** -0.5149 (0.215)** 
working 0.1573 (0.111) 0.1277 (0.131) 
f_inc_eq1 0.0817 (0.153) 0.0775 (0.180) 
f_inc_eq2 0.0967 (0.095) 0.0341 (0.108) 
f_inc_eq4 0.2693 (0.124)** 0.1937 (0.140)* 
f_inc_eq5 0.2938 (0.151)* 0.3793 (0.173)** 
edu2 -0.8153 (0.414)** -0.8520 (0.523) 
edu3 -0.7633 (0.406)* -0.8401 (0.515) 
edu4 -0.7824 (0.412)* -0.9229 (0.520) 
married 0.1296 (0.110) 0.2037 (0.124) 
divorced  0.0499 (0.163) 0.0558 (0.183) 
widowed 0.5095 (0.184)*** 0.5059 (0.207)* 
children1 0.1830 (0.121) 0.2186 (0.139) 
children2 0.0899 (0.167) -0.1075 (0.196) 
children3 -0.5295 (0.338) -0.4251 (0.364) 
east -0.2104 (0.091)** -0.2033 (0.104)* 
high confidence   -0.0441 (0.091) 
no access   0.3584 (0.088)*** 
reason: behavior   0.0931 (0.098) 
reason: genes   -0.0230 (0.098) 
reason: poverty   -0.0632 (0.089) 
best treatment   -0.3458 (0.096)*** 
cigarettes 1-5   0.1236 (0.206) 
cigarettes 6-10   -0.0844 (0.158) 
cigarettes >10   0.0908 (0.120) 
alcohol   -0.0129 (0.188) 
SAH   -0.0513 (0.054) 
hospital   -0.0572 (0.117) 
SHI   -0.2581 (0.175) 
SHI & private suppl.   0.1757 (0.229) 
insurance civil servants   0.0434 (0.271) 
non profit -0.1409 (0.095) -0.1431 (0.115) 
religion -0.0909 (0.090) -0.1315 (0.102) 
_cons 0.8266 (0.429)* 1.3347 (0.599) 
N 1,198  977  
AIC 1597.4  1292.8  
BIC 1714.4  1478.4  
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.041  0.078  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Having children as a prioritization criterion 
Finally, the criterion whether a patient is responsible for children or not is investigated. The 
results of probit models for the restricted and full specification can be found in table 6. In the 
restricted model, we find gender effects for the prioritizing decision between subjects having 
children and the option no-difference. Thus, females are less likely to give priority to families 
with children. This result is surprising as females are more likely to match the characteristics 
of this respective patient group. Whether a family has children or has no children within the 
household does affect their attitudes towards prioritizing subjects with children only in the case 
of one child within the household. Individuals with one child are more likely to give priority to 
subjects with children pointing again to some vague influence of egoistic motives, although the 
coefficient is only significant at the 10 % level. In addition, the results for family status (mar-
ried, divorced and widowed) suggest that individuals with experience in partnership or family 
life are strongly in favor to give priority to subjects with children compared to the reference 
category – singles. Finally, religiousness influences the probability to prioritize subjects with 
children, indicating a high value religious people attach to the protection of families and chil-
dren. 
The same observation holds when considering the effects of having responsibility for children 
in the full specification [2]. Families with one child show a stronger tendency to prefer subjects 
with children. Compared to the estimation only including socioeconomic variables, the level of 
significance increases and supports our finding of egoistic motives among families with chil-
dren. 
Health behavior has no significant effect for the prioritizing decisions of patients with chil-
dren. We do not find individuals’ health status or insurance coverage to affect the decision on 
priorities. Again, being responsible for children is accepted by religious people as a priority 
criterion. 
Attitudes towards family life and religion seem to be quite strongly related to the judgment that 
the external effects on the children ought to be considered when prioritizing between patients 
with or without responsibility for children. 
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Table 6: Estimation results single probit models – having children vs. no-difference 
 [1] 
restricted model 
[2] 
full specification 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female -0.2264 (0.081)*** -0.2249 (0.093)*** 
age2 -0.1806 (0.155) -0.1449 (0.176) 
age3 -0.3980 (0.157)** -0.4201 (0.178)** 
age4 -0.3440 (0.157)** -0.3368 (0.181)* 
age5 -0.2138 (0.187) -0.1799 (0.219) 
working 0.0005 (0.114) 0.0964 (0.135) 
f_inc_eq1 0.1014 (0.157) 0.0116 (0.181) 
f_inc_eq2 -0.0200 (0.098) -0.1313 (0.110) 
f_inc_eq4 0.1103 (0.129) 0.0707 (0.145) 
f_inc_eq5 -0.1770 (0.166) -0.1514 (0.183) 
edu2 -0.4210 (0.367) -0.4213 (0.470)** 
edu3 -0.6705 (0.360)* -0.5837 (0.462)*** 
edu4 -0.7297 (0.367)** -0.6747 (0.469)*** 
married 0.2779 (0.116)** 0.2411 (0.128)* 
divorced  0.3093 (0.172)* 0.2529 (0.191) 
widowed 0.6021 (0.192)*** 0.5400 (0.215)* 
children1 0.2229 (0.123)* 0.2798 (0.139)** 
children2 0.0615 (0.175) 0.0386 (0.201) 
children3 -0.0474 (0.321) -0.1121 (0.362) 
east 0.0755 (0.095) 0.0597 (0.107) 
high confidence   -0.0417 (0.092) 
no access   0.3229 (0.090)*** 
reason: behavior   -0.0083 (0.101) 
reason: genes   0.0280 (0.100) 
reason: poverty   0.0194 (0.091) 
best treatment   -0.0510 (0.097) 
cigarettes 1-5   0.2336 (0.208) 
cigarettes 6-10   -0.0161 (0.166) 
cigarettes >10   0.0609 (0.123) 
alcohol   -0.0071 (0.191) 
SAH   0.0748 (0.056) 
hospital   -0.0231 (0.121) 
SHI   0.0515 (0.183) 
SHI & private suppl.   -0.1635 (0.240) 
insurance civil servants   0.3077 (0.270) 
non profit -0.0206 (0.098) 0.0265 (0.116) 
religion 0.2684 (0.095)*** 0.2296 (0.106)** 
_cons 0.0105 (0.386) -0.4267 (0.559) 
N 1,204  986  
AIC 1460.1  1,222.4  
BIC 1577.3  1,408.4  
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.003  0.045  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Correlations between decisions on priorities 
Attitudes towards prioritization according to the three criteria we have investigated separately 
before might be correlated. Decisions might be governed by some more general attitude of an 
individual to be willing to prioritize or not. Table 6 shows a cross tabulation of the three prior-
itization decisions which indicates a relationship between them. 
Table 6: Cross tabulation of prioritization decisions 
 [2] 
young vs. 
no-difference 
[3] 
having children vs. 
no-difference 
 
young no-diff. sum 
chil-
dren 
no-diff sum 
[1] 
non-smoker 
vs.  
no-diff. 
non-smoker 248 141 389 203 195 398 
no diff. 339 741 1080 238 843 1081 
sum 587 882 1469 441 1038 1479 
[2] 
young  
vs. 
no-diff. 
young    305 284 589 
no-diff    130 769 899 
sum    435 1053 1488 
 
741 people choosing the no-difference option in the smoking question also choose the no-dif-
ference option in the prioritization question regarding age, 843 people choose the no-difference 
option in the smoking and having children question. The comparison between the criteria age 
and having children yields similar results. Overall, 38 % of the respondents always choose the 
no-difference option indicating a general aversion to make priority decisions. On the contrary, 
some individuals accept every reason for prioritizing. The highest consensus can be found be-
tween age and having children (305 respondents). About 9 % are accepting smoking, age and 
having children as prioritization criteria. Hence, in the next step we apply a model for simulta-
neous equations to account for unobserved correlations among prioritization decisions. Tables 7 
and 8 present the results of multivariate probit models for the restricted model and the full 
specification. 
The estimation results for both restricted and full specifications indicate that decisions on pri-
oritization criteria are not independent and the proposed multivariate probit model results in 
efficiency gains compared to separate probit estimations. As it becomes clear from the bottom 
of both tables, the pairwise correlations between the three prioritizing decisions ρ are signifi-
cantly positive. A positive correlation coefficient indicates that unobservable factors influence 
both decisions in the same direction. The correlation remains highly significant even when con-
trolling for attitudes towards aspects of the health system, health behavior, health status and 
insurance coverage as well as collective goals. The positive correlation between equation [1] 
(non-smoker vs. no-difference) and equation [2] (young vs. no-difference) as well as between 
equation [1] and equation [3] (having children vs. non-difference) is of similar magnitude sug-
gesting that there exists a general attitude to set priorities according to the criteria smoking and 
age which is not covered by our data. The correlation between equation [2] and equation [3] is 
somewhat higher. Hence, decisions to prioritize or not are even stronger correlated between the 
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criteria age and having children. This result is in line with the cross tabulation presented before 
and the descriptive statistics in section 3. 
Table 7: Estimation results of the multivariate probit model – restricted  
 [1] 
non-smoker vs.  
no-difference 
[2] 
young vs. 
no-difference 
[3] 
having children vs. 
no-difference 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female -0.0940 (0.089) -0.1225 (0.082) -0.2527 (0.089)*** 
age2 -0.1836 (0.164) -0.3550 (0.161)** -0.2527 (0.170) 
age3 -0.3494 (0.161)** -0.6023 (0.158)*** -0.4475 (0.177)** 
age4 -0.6225 (0.169)*** -0.5568 (0.157)*** -0.3575 (0.173)** 
age5 -0.4520 (0.204)** -0.3577 (0.191)* -0.1878 (0.207) 
working 0.0907 (0.132) 0.1739 (0.121) 0.0440 (0.126) 
f_inc_eq1 0.0310 (0.172) 0.0474 (0.165) 0.0905 (0.174) 
f_inc_eq2 -0.1394 (0.111) 0.0898 (0.101) -0.0175 (0.106) 
f_inc_eq4 0.1102 (0.140) 0.2340 (0.132)* 0.1333 (0.141) 
f_inc_eq5 -0.0357 (0.178) 0.2558 (0.161) -0.0876 (0.167) 
edu2 -0.5417 (0.368) -0.7757 (0.475) -0.2683 (0.407) 
edu3 -0.7608 (0.358)** -0.7331 (0.468) -0.4510 (0.399) 
edu4 -0.7103 (0.369)* -0.7315 (0.474) -0.5305 (0.408) 
married 0.0439 (0.128) 0.1079 (0.116) 0.2872 (0.129)** 
divorced -0.0984 (0.196) 0.0378 (0.173) 0.3077 (0.190) 
widowed  0.3266 (0.223) 0.4616 (0.194)** 0.5925 (0.214)*** 
children1 -0.0475 (0.140) 0.2345 (0.128)* 0.1773 (0.134) 
children2 -0.1380 (0.199) 0.0378 (0.188) 0.0958 (0.196) 
children3 -0.0826 (0.394) -0.6293 (0.380)* -0.1508 (0.400) 
east 0.2011 (0.102)* -0.1997 (0.097)** 0.0795 (0.101) 
non profit 0.1435 (0.108) -0.0923 (0.104) -0.0084 (0.106) 
religion -0.1611 (0.103) -0.0981 (0.096) 0.2693 (0.103)*** 
_cons 0.3843 (0.388) 0.7573 (0.489) -0.2223 (0.419) 
ρ ([1], [2]) 0.437 (0.046)     
ρ ([1], [3]) 0.466 (0.047)     
ρ ([2], [3]) 0.624 (0.037)     
N 1,112      
AIC 3763.3      
BIC 4109.3      
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.232      
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Comparing the results of the multivariate probit models to the estimation of single probit mod-
els shows some differences regarding the level of significance of the coefficients while the 
magnitude of the coefficients are almost not changing. This figure again supports the use of the 
multivariate probit model to estimate the prioritizing decisions. We still find strong negative 
effects for females for the decision to prioritize subjects with children against those without 
children. The effect remains significant even when including further control variables in the 
full specification model. The effect of age continues to prevail in both multivariate probit mod-
els. Especially for the decision to give priority to young subjects compared to choose the no-
difference option, young people are more likely to prefer the young subject whereas older sub-
jects tend to choose the no-difference option. The findings of the multivariate probit model 
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support the results derived from single probit models that young subjects seem to decide quite 
egoistically favoring patients of their own age group. On the contrary, moral motives seem to 
predominate egoistic motives for older subjects.  
In contrast to the models not accounting for correlated decisions, family status does not exhibit 
statistical significance (full specification). Furthermore, the effect of children diminishes in case 
of prioritizing subjects with children. Based on the results of the multivariate probit model we 
have to reject our previous findings that families with children give high value to some egoistic 
preferences. Whether an individual has children or does not have children doesn’t affect her 
attitude concerning the prioritization of subjects with children. Hence, egoistic motives seem 
not to be of large relevance for this group. As assumed in the hypotheses section, the aspect of 
having children is not used by many subjects as a justification for egoistic preferences indicat-
ing that people with children perceive that they do not have large support within the German 
society. 
In line with the results of single probit models, the variables no access and reason: behavior 
have a significant positive effect. The conviction that health problems arise from health dam-
aging behavior and that these subjects should not be treated by publicly funded institutions 
results in a strong tendency to prioritize non-smokers. Interestingly, the effect of no access can 
also be found for the prioritizing decision of young and subjects with children. An intuitive 
conclusion is that this variable covers a general tendency to accept every criterion to prioritize, 
as summarized before.  
Finally, smokers exhibit a higher probability to choose the no-difference option than non-smok-
ers. This effect becomes even stronger the more cigarettes per day are smoked. Thus, the results 
from the single probit models are strongly supported by the estimates of multivariate probit 
models.  
Summarizing the results for Germans attitudes towards prioritizing, first, we find evidence that 
decisions about different prioritizing criteria are not independent. There seems to be an overall 
general attitude whether a person is willing to prioritize or whether this person wants every 
individual to be treated equally. There is evidence that this conviction strongly affects an indi-
vidual’s preferences towards prioritization with respect to all three considered criteria. Second, 
results indicate that young individuals prioritize egoistically. Furthermore, individuals behav-
ing health damaging show a strong preference for the no-difference option indicating strong 
moral motives. Moreover, subjects with children do not find strong support within the German 
society. This criterion is not accepted to make decisions on who should be treated first.  
However, we are restricted to observable factors and to variables conducted in the survey. Of 
course, the strong tendency to the no-difference option could also be due to the fact that re-
spondents would prefer more medical indicators to be considered in the scenarios when they 
have to decide on priorities, and not socioeconomic factors. 
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Table 8: Estimation results of the multivariate probit model – full specification 
 [1] 
non-smoker vs.  
no-difference 
[2] 
young vs. 
no-difference 
[3] 
having children vs. 
no-difference 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female -0.1650 (0.115) -0.0792 (0.098) -0.2477 (0.104)** 
age2 -0.0943 (0.198) -0.4463 (0.189)** -0.1788 (0.200) 
age3 -0.4842 (0.204)** -0.7464 (0.192)*** -0.4770 (0.205)** 
age4 -0.8001 (0.209)*** -0.6812 (0.187)*** -0.2967 (0.203) 
age5 -0.7784 (0.268)*** -0.5427 (0.231)** -0.1275 (0.239) 
working 0.1010 (0.185) 0.1171 (0.145) 0.1687 (0.150) 
f_inc_eq1 0.2225 (0.212) 0.0582 (0.202) 0.0472 (0.207) 
f_inc_eq2 -0.1578 (0.137) 0.0570 (0.118) -0.1010 (0.124) 
f_inc_eq4 0.1998 (0.181) 0.1444 (0.148) 0.1254 (0.165) 
f_inc_eq5 0.0306 (0.217) 0.3117 (0.190) -0.0171 (0.185) 
edu2 -0.1601 (0.550) -0.7620 (0.656) -0.2301 (0.519) 
edu3 -0.2606 (0.540) -0.7106 (0.649) -0.3854 (0.520) 
edu4 -0.3717 (0.547) -0.7913 (0.652) -0.4894 (0.526) 
married 0.0209 (0.150) 0.2021 (0.136) 0.2376 (0.148) 
divorced  -0.2007 (0.272) 0.0932 (0.199) 0.2359 (0.225) 
widowed 0.4503 (0.283) 0.5112 (0.226)** 0.5287 (0.247)** 
children1 0.0517 (0.177) 0.2283 (0.154) 0.2394 (0.155) 
children2 0.0307 (0.243) -0.0720 (0.216) 0.1876 (0.238) 
children3 0.1019 (0.459) -0.6123 (0.479) -0.0385 (0.429) 
east 0.2864 (0.125)** -0.1759 (0.113) 0.0361 (0.121) 
high confidence 0.0125 (0.115) -0.0566 (0.098) 0.0138 (0.103) 
no access 0.6902 (0.112)*** 0.3327 (0.098)*** 0.3678 (0.100)*** 
reason: behavior 0.3096 (0.131)** 0.0864 (0.108) -0.0274 (0.110) 
reason: genes -0.1299 (0.124) -0.0290 (0.108) 0.0248 (0.113) 
reason: poverty -0.0103 (0.111) -0.0306 (0.098) 0.0219 (0.103) 
best treatment 0.0211 (0.120) -0.3304 (0.103)*** -0.1267 (0.112) 
cigarettes 1-5 -0.6828 (0.287)** 0.1391 (0.230) 0.2169 (0.233) 
cigarettes 6-10 -0.6959 (0.222)*** -0.1919 (0.182) -0.0344 (0.187) 
cigarettes >10 -0.7240 (0.167)*** 0.0838 (0.127) -0.0037 (0.139) 
alcohol -0.0429 (0.245) -0.0525 (0.215) -0.0848 (0.232) 
SAH -0.0448 (0.072) -0.0725 (0.060) 0.0801 (0.060) 
hospital -0.1479 (0.160) -0.0302 (0.129) 0.0335 (0.139) 
SHI 0.1042 (0.253) -0.2341 (0.193) 0.0727 (0.207) 
SHI & private suppl. 0.0221 (0.315) 0.1756 (0.253) -0.2490 (0.275) 
insurance civil servants -0.1485 (0.349) 0.0896 (0.303) 0.3677 (0.298) 
non profit 0.2265 (0.140) -0.0964 (0.126) 0.0036 (0.128) 
religion -0.2801 (0.126)** -0.1043 (0.110) 0.2213 (0.122)* 
_cons -0.1173 (0.712) 1.2254 (0.729)* -0.7172 (0.618) 
ρ ([1], [2]) 0.462 (0.057)***     
ρ ([1], [3]) 0.494 (0.058)***     
ρ ([2], [3]) 0.626 (0.043)***     
N 927      
AIC 3082.4      
BIC 3633.2      
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.371      
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.2 Judgment of distributional justice 
In the second part of this paper, we focus on income dependent health services and whether 
German citizens treat this aspect as fair or unfair. This question is of particular importance as 
the social health care system – like others – is confronted with the scarcity of resources and 
cutbacks of health services are discussed from time to time. As a consequence, individuals are 
forced to obtain private coverage which results in distributional challenges. 
The generated four-point categorical variable judgment of inequality is estimated by an ordered 
probit model once including only socioeconomic variables [1] and once controlling for a full 
list of other controls. Results are presented in table 9. 
Females are found to significantly grade income dependent health services as unfair. This result 
is in line with more general literature about redistribution indicating a higher preference for 
distributional justice among females (cf. Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Guillaud 2012). The in-
fluence of egoistic motives can only partially be confirmed. Of the four income categories, only 
individuals of category four (i.e. incomes between 2,250 € and 3,000 €) differ in their judgment 
on distribution justice. This group shows a tendency to assess income dependent health services 
as fair, although the variable exhibits only weak statistical significance (10 % level in the full 
specification). Hence, moral motives seem to predominate and even individuals with higher 
incomes classify income dependent health services as unfair although they would benefit. In 
line with the descriptive statistics presented in section 3, a majority of individuals exhibit norms 
of equal access to medical services and claims income dependent health services to be unfair. 
Other socioeconomic variables are not found to affect the judgment of distribution justice. 
More interestingly, attitudes on specific aspects of the health system have a strong impact on 
individuals’ preferences. Individuals with high confidence in the current health system are more 
likely to say that income dependent health services are fair, thereby contradicting our expecta-
tion that this conviction should result in indifference. The preference to reduce health services 
to a minimum (limited services) is associated with an attitude to favor income dependent health 
services. These respondents seem to favor a health system where individuals are able to top up 
public health services by private coverage according to their financial situation. For reform and 
higher taxes we find positive effects. A desire to completely change the current health system 
in Germany is connected to an aversion against income dependent health services and inequal-
ity. One explanation might be, that the request for reforms is implies by the opinion that the 
differentiation between public and private health insurance in Germany must be changed. In 
accordance to this, individuals who are willing to accept higher taxes to improve the health care 
system in Germany treat income dependent health services as unfair. This is consistent with the 
observations related to reform, as higher taxes imply a higher share of redistribution devoted to 
public health care. The results of publicly insured subjects (SHI) support this conclusion. Com-
pared to privately insured, income dependent health services are more likely to be judged as 
unfair among publicly insured. Finally, no treatment: waiting list covers experiences of re-
spondents who did not get a medical treatment because the waiting list was too long. This ex-
perience of unequal treatment has a strong effect on individual’s judgment of fairness, leading 
to a strong aversion of income dependent health services. 
Summarizing, the results for judgment of fairness of income dependent health service shows 
that individuals are not mainly egoistically motivated. Instead, moral norms of equal treatment 
seem to dominate. Moreover, socioeconomic factors do only weakly explain attitudes. General 
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attitudes and experiences with the health care system as well as own health status seem to be 
more relevant. The willingness to change the health system and a higher preference for redis-
tribution devoted to the health system help to understand distributional preferences. In contrast, 
an attitude to reduce health services to a minimum is associated with a tendency to favor private 
additional coverage. 
Table 9: Estimation results of ordered probit models for judgment of inequality 
 [1] 
judgment of inequality 
[2] 
judgement of inequality 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
female 0,2346 (0,066)*** 0,1791 (0,075)** 
age2 0,0185 (0,132) -0,1346 (0,150) 
age3 0,1431 (0,124) 0,0884 (0,142) 
age4 0,0887 (0,128) -0,0451 (0,149) 
age5 0,2639 (0,155)* 0,1059 (0,182) 
working 0,0140 (0,091) 0,0113 (0,106) 
f_inc_eq1 0,1042 (0,129) 0,0753 (0,156) 
f_inc_eq2 0,0708 (0,079) 0,0478 (0,089) 
f_inc_eq4 -0,2137 (0,100)** -0,1979 (0,112)* 
f_inc_eq5 -0,2053 (0,131) -0,1585 (0,145) 
edu2 -0,5731 (0,396) -0,3311 (0,518) 
edu3 -0,5981 (0,394) -0,5263 (0,518) 
edu4 -0,6942 (0,399)* -0,5909 (0,524) 
married 0,0513 (0,092) 0,1064 (0,106) 
divorced -0,0236 (0,133) 0,0950 (0,145) 
widowed  0,1147 (0,161) 0,2328 (0,187) 
children1 -0,0651 (0,101) -0,0633 (0,115) 
children2 -0,2965 (0,138)** -0,1978 (0,153) 
children3 0,2684 (0,263) 0,1917 (0,254) 
east 0,0729 (0,075) 0,0956 (0,085) 
non profit 0,1658 (0,082)** 0,2138 (0,098)** 
religion -0,1674 (0,076)** -0,1190 (0,083) 
high confidence   -0,1840 (0,084)** 
reform   0,3229 (0,083)*** 
limited services   -0,2062 (0,091)** 
inefficient health system   -0,0273 (0,081) 
higher taxes   0,1359 (0,081)* 
SAH   0,0987 (0,046)** 
hospital   0,1931 (0,095)** 
no treatment: waiting list   0,3096 (0,157)** 
SHI   0,5440 (0,132)*** 
SHI & private suppl. Insurance   0,5240 (0,182)*** 
insurance civil servants   0,3996 (0,197)** 
N 1,249  1,033  
AIC 3,009,5  2,421,7  
BIC 3,137,8  2,599,6  
pseudo R-squared adj. 0,007  0,032  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.3 Discussion 
The results presented so far and their implications should be discussed precisely. Therefore, we 
analyze the willingness to prioritize in more detail.  
There is a general tendency to prioritize or to choose the no-difference option as the correlations 
and the results of the multivariate probit models suggest. Thus, table 10 presents result of two 
probit models with prioritize [1] and change [2] as dependent variables.  
Table 10: Estimation results of probit models for general prioritizing attitudes 
 [1] 
prioritize 
[2] 
change 
 coeff. SE coeff. SE 
female -0,271 (0,158)* -0,011 (0,090) 
age2 -0,185 (0,295) -0,411 (0,170)** 
age3 -0,624 (0,292)** -0,493 (0,172)*** 
age4 -0,781 (0,304)** -0,541 (0,173)*** 
age5 -0,538 (0,362) -0,405 (0,210)* 
working 0,089 (0,224) 0,170 (0,129) 
f_inc_eq1 0,093 (0,290) -0,130 (0,178) 
f_inc_eq2 -0,126 (0,187) -0,000 (0,108) 
f_inc_eq4 0,119 (0,259) 0,230 (0,143) 
f_inc_eq5 0,374 (0,312) 0,251 (0,178) 
edu2 -0,472 (0,947) -0,846 (0,490)* 
edu3 -0,849 (0,939) -0,827 (0,480)* 
edu4 -0,873 (0,946) -0,995 (0,487)** 
married 0,446 (0,220)** -0,050 (0,122) 
divorced 0,191 (0,323) -0,268 (0,181) 
widowed 1,033 (0,356)*** 0,100 (0,209) 
children1 0,398 (0,238)* 0,023 (0,139) 
children2 -0,073 (0,336) -0,130 (0,199) 
children3 0,057 (0,546) -0,533 (0,350) 
east  0,076 (0,181) -0,021 (0,104) 
high confidence 0,079 (0,159) 0,013 (0,090) 
no access 0,925 (0,152)*** -0,262 (0,088)*** 
demanding behavior 0,172 (0,178) 0,044 (0,097) 
genes -0,266 (0,172) 0,119 (0,099) 
poverty -0,051 (0,157) -0,054 (0,088) 
best treatment -0,299 (0,172)* -0,213 (0,095)** 
SAH -0,152 (0,098) 0,046 (0,055) 
hospital 0,009 (0,205) -0,141 (0,117) 
SHI 0,208 (0,344) -0,324 (0,177)* 
SHI & private suppl. 0,057 (0,489) 0,251 (0,235) 
insurance civil servants 0,325 (0,525) 0,208 (0,275) 
non profit -0,006 (0,198) -0,060 (0,114) 
religion 0,012 (0,180) -0,079 (0,102) 
_cons -0,000 (1,081) 1,146 (0,571)** 
pseudo R-squared adj. 0.029  0.008  
AIC 604.37  1,303,24  
BIC 460.14  1,468,44  
ll -196.07  -617,62  
N 514  952  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The variable prioritize equals one, if an individual accepts every criterion to deviate from the 
no-difference option and zero otherwise. In contrast, change covers those individuals who 
changed their decisions across the three prioritizing decisions. About 9 % prioritize in every 
scenario whereas about 40 % have differentiated attitudes towards prioritization and choose 
differently in different prioritization decisions. 
The probability to accept every criterion to prioritize is affected by gender, age, family status 
and attitudes towards aspects of the health system. In detail, females are less likely to always 
prioritize. The same is true for individuals in age group three and four. In contrast, married and 
widowed subjects strongly tend to prioritize according to the criteria smoking, age and subjects 
with children. As suggested in section 4.1, individuals who do not want that individuals with 
health damaging behavior are treated by the public health system are strongly in favor to prior-
itize. The intuition that this variable is a strong indicator of some general form of prioritizing 
attitude is supported by estimation [1].  
In line with the results provided in column one, individuals are less likely to change their deci-
sions with age. Thus, older subjects have a tendency to stay with the same option in each sce-
nario. We also find education to affect the probability to change. The higher the education sta-
tus, the less likely individuals are to change their decision about prioritization from scenario to 
scenario and the more likely they are to stay with one specific conviction. Finally, the variable 
no access indicates a general tendency to consistently choose one option. In combination with 
the results for prioritize this means to accept each of the three criteria to prioritize. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The attitudes of the German public towards prioritization in the public health sector can be 
characterized by a general reluctance to define strict priorities. Many respondents choose the 
no-difference option in one, two or all three of the considered scenarios. About 38% of the 
respondents always choose the no-difference option, whereas only 9% always vote for priori-
ties. There are differences in attitudes between the criteria offered, i.e. smoker vs. non-smoker, 
age, and having children or not. The most accepted criterion for posteriorizing is smoking. This 
is in accordance to results of the empirical analysis revealing strong effects of individuals’ at-
titudes regarding general aspects of the health system on priorities, e.g. that individuals behav-
ing health demanding should not be preferred. Related to the weight individuals attach to ego-
istic preferences in priority judgments we only find clear evidence that young respondents tend 
to prefer young patients more often than older respondents do. The criterion of having children 
does not seem to be a generally accepted reason for priority setting in the German society. Only 
respondents with one children and religious people reveal some tendency to favor a patient who 
is responsible for children. Our results representative for the German public opinion suggest 
that voters may not approve a health policy implementing priority setting with respect to per-
sonal characteristics of patients except perhaps for some posteriorizing of smokers. 
About 75 % of the Germans exhibit a strong aversion against income dependent health services. 
This seems to be quite a strong result, since the quality of treatment in the German health system 
depends on the insurance status (public and/or private) and on willingness to pay for additional 
service. This opinion is related to the status of public insurance, negative experience of limited 
access to health treatment, low confidence in the system and the desire to reform it. A health 
29 
policy strengthening the differences in quality of health care between patients with different 
insurance status or income would probably be rejected by a majority of the German public.  
The high shares of no-difference answers in the prioritization decisions may on the one hand 
indicate that many people are convinced that it is appropriate to apply equal treatment norms. 
Under this assumption the votes for no-difference and deviations in favor of some group of 
patients are analyzed and interpreted in this paper. On the other hand by choosing no-difference 
respondents can avoid making a hard decision. If one wants to go a research route beyond pure 
priority judgments towards rationing decisions as they have to be made in the public health 
system scenarios have to be designed differently. As we have argued before, decisions on ra-
tioning cannot be derived uniquely from priority judgments. Opportunity costs of decisions 
have to be made more prominent and different qualities and quantities of treatments and modes 
of financing have to be modelled, too. However, this kind of analysis in not feasible with the 
data offered by the ISSP survey. There is some evidence that subjects start to think differently 
about priorities if a rationing decision is inevitable. It seems that facing concrete scarcity con-
straints subjects learn to accept some kind of rationing. If one wants to elicit the public prefer-
ences on rationing of health care an impulse to start this learning process has to be given in the 
questionnaire. The necessity of an impulse to think about rationing and not only about priorities 
holds also true for the public reflection process. 
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